Voting, the Symmetric Group, and Representation Theory by Daugherty, Zajj, \u2705 et al.
Claremont Colleges
Scholarship @ Claremont
All HMC Faculty Publications and Research HMC Faculty Scholarship
12-17-2009
Voting, the Symmetric Group, and Representation
Theory
Zajj Daugherty '05
Harvey Mudd College
Alexander K. Eustis '06
Harvey Mudd College
Gregory Minton '08
Harvey Mudd College
Michael E. Orrison
Harvey Mudd College
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the HMC Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion
in All HMC Faculty Publications and Research by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more information, please contact
scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daugherty, Zajj, Alexander K. Eustis, Gregory Minton, and Michael E. Orrison. "Voting, the Symmetric Group, and Representation
Theory." American Mathematical Monthly 116.8 (2009): 667-87. Print.
Voting, the Symmetric Group, 
and Representation Theory 
Zajj Daugherty, Alexander K. Eustis, Gregory Minton, 
and Michael E. Orrison 
1. INTRODUCTION. For more than 25 years, Donald Saari has been systemati- 
cally developing a powerful geometric approach to understanding, explaining, and 
constructing paradoxes that occur in voting [7]-[18]. One of the keys to Saari's ge- 
ometric approach is the fact that the collection of votes from an election can often be 
encoded naturally as a vector, which we call a profile, and that election procedures can 
often be viewed as, or are related to, linear transformations. 
By focusing on specific geometric structures in this vector space setting, Saari has 
been able to sidestep many of the prohibitively difficult combinatorial obstructions 
that are often associated with voting analysis. In doing so, he draws our attention to 
the specialized roles played by a handful of specific subspaces of the vector space 
of profiles. This geometric approach has led to an impressive number of unexpected 
results in voting theory, as well as a refined understanding of many fundamental nd 
important results in the field (see [14] and [15] for engaging overviews of the subject). 
Ever since we began thinking about the mathematics of voting, we have been in- 
trigued by the prominent role played by symmetry arguments in Saari's work (see [9], 
[11], and [14] for gentle introductions to such arguments). In particular, it seemed to 
us that many of the symmetry-based ideas we were encountering could be explained 
easily if we only had the right algebraic framework. In this paper, we describe just 
such a framework. More specifically, we show how voting may be viewed naturally 
from an algebraic perspective by viewing profiles as elements of certain well-studied 
QSn -modules. 
By using only a handful of simple combinatorial objects (e.g., tabloids) and some 
basic ideas from representation theory (e.g., Schur's Lemma), we are able to recast 
and extend some of Saari's well-known results. For example, we recover a result con- 
cerning the important relationship between the Borda count and pairwise voting when 
voters return full rankings of the candidates (Theorem 6). We then extend this result to 
a situation in which voters return partial rankings of the candidates (Theorem 9). In the 
process, we construct an infinite family of "Borda-like" voting procedures. With the 
help of our main theorem (Theorem 1), we also, for example, address the relationship 
between positional voting and approval voting (Theorem 2). 
Our experience to date has convinced us that approaching the study of voting from 
an algebraic perspective can be incredibly illuminating when it comes to understand- 
ing the mathematical underpinnings of many different voting procedures. In fact, we 
see this paper as a first step toward what might eventually be called algebraic voting 
theory. Although the ideas presented here are just the tip of the iceberg, we believe 
they will be of great interest o voting theorists and enthusiasts alike. 
2. VOTING ON TABLOIDS. We begin by introducing combinatorial objects called 
tabloids. These objects play an important role in the representation theory of the sym- 
metric group (see, for example, [19]). Tabloids also appear in the analysis of partially 
ranked data, which includes the type of voting data we will be considering throughout 
this paper (see [4] and [6]). 
doi: 10.4169/193009709X460796 
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Let «bea positive integer. A composition of n is a sequence À = (Ài, . . . , Àm) of 
positive integers whose sum is n. If Ài > • • • > Àm, then À is a partition of n. For 
example, À = (2, 1 , 1 , 3) is a composition of 7, but not a partition of 7, and (4, 2, 1 , 1) 
is a partition (and therefore also a composition) of 8. 
The Ferrers diagram of shape À is the left-justified array of dots with À,- dots in 
the /th row (see Figure 1). If the dots of a Ferrers diagram of shape À are replaced 
by boxes containing the numbers 1, . . . , n without repetition, then we create a Young 
tableau of shape À. Two Young tableaux are said to be row equivalent if they differ 
only by a permutation of the entries within the rows of each tableau. An equivalence 
class of tableaux under this relation is called a tabloid of shape À. 
• • • 
• • • 
Figure 1. The Ferrers diagram of shape (2, 3, 1, 3). 
We will denote a tabloid by first forming a representative tableau and then removing 
the vertical dividers within each row (see Figure 2). For convenience, we will usually 
choose the representative tableau whose entries in each row are in ascending order. 
4 1 9 1 I 9 1 4 I 1 4 9 | 
5 2 1 3 1 2 5 1 3 | 2 3 5 
_L _Z_ 7 | 8 1 1 1 6 1 1 6 1 8 1 1 1 | 1 6 8 
Figure 2. Two equivalent tableaux and their tabloid. 
Let Xk denote the set of tabloids of shape À. Tabloids can be used to index voting 
data. For example, suppose there are n candidates, ci, . . . , c„, in an election. If the 
voters have been asked to vote by returning a list of the candidates in order of prefer- 
ence, from most to least favored, then each voter is essentially being asked to choose 
a tabloid from the set X(lt -1). For example, if there are n = 3 candidates, then each 
voter must return one of the following tabloids from X(111): 
TI IT] IT] ÍT1 IT] IT" 
2,3,1,3,1,2. 
T~| [~2~1 |T| 'T' '2' 1 
In this case, a voter who returns the second tabloid above prefers c' to c?> to c2, whereas 
a voter who returns the last tabloid prefers c3 to c2 to c' . 
On the other hand, suppose the voters are asked to simply vote for their favorite 
candidate. We could certainly obtain this information from the choices they made from 
X(l  1} by focusing only on top-ranked candidates. It may be much easier (for us and 
them), however, to have them choose from the set Xihn~l). For example, if n = 4, then 
we would be asking our voters to choose one of the following tabloids from X(h3): 
~n ' rY] ' it] ' pn 2 3 4 | | 1 3 4 | | 1 2 4 | | 1 2 3 ' 
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In this case, by choosing the third tabloid above, a voter is saying that her favorite 
candidate isc3 (and that she is indifferent, as far as her vote is concerned, tocandidates 
c', c2, andc4). 
When voters are asked to provide their rankings of the candidates by choosing a 
tabloid from X(h -1), we say that they are giving full rankings of the candidates; if 
they are choosing tabloids from Xk where À^(l,...,l), then we say that they are 
giving partial rankings of the candidates. 
To determine the winner of an election based on choosing tabloids from Xk, we 
need to know the number of votes received by each x g Xk. With that in mind, let 
p : Xk -> N be the function such that p(x) is the number of voters that voted for the 
tabloid x. The function p is called & profile. 
In fact, we will call every function p : Xk -> Q a profile. We do this primarily 
because, unlike functions from Xk to N, the set Mk of all functions p : Xk -> Q 
forms a vector space (over Q) where, for all p, q € Mk and all a e Q, (p + q)(x) = 
p(jc) + q(x) and (ap)(x) = ap(x). Note that he dimension of Mk is 'Xk', and that 
the indicator functions form a basis for Mk (where the indicator function for x e Xk 
is the function that is 1 on x and 0 on every other tabloid in Xk). 
When it is convenient, we will also view a profile p e Mk as a formal linear combi- 
nation of the tabloids in Xk, where the coefficient in front of the tabloid x is p(x). For 
example, if n = 3 and there are eleven voters, then our profile (which is an example 
used in Chapter 2 of [14]) might look like 
T] IT] IT] [TI ITI HT 
3 T~ + 2 ~3~ + 0 1 +2 _3_ + 0 J_ + 4 _2_ 
~3~l ¡i] [j] rn |t] n~ 
where three voters chose the first list, two voters chose the second list, zero voters 
chose the third list, and so on. We will return to this example again and again. When 
we do, we will refer to it as the "three-candidate nd eleven- voter" example. 
Although viewing profiles as formal linear combinations oftabloids can be useful 
at times, we will typically view profiles as column vectors in Q|X '. We do this by 
choosing the indicator functions of Mk as a basis, which we order based on the lexi- 
cographic ordering of the tabloids. For example, we would encode the above profile as 
the vector 
"3"| 123 
2 132 
0 213 
P~ 2 231 
0 312 
Al 321 
where we have placed labels corresponding to the rankings to the right of the vector 
so that he correspondence can be seen more easily. 
3. POSITIONAL VOTING PROCEDURES. Now that we know what profiles look 
like, we can turn our attention tovoting procedures. In this paper, we will primarily 
focus our attention o  voting procedures that assign points to each candidate based on 
their position in a voter's choice of a tabloid. 
Let X = (Ài, . . . , km) be a composition of n, let w = [wu . . . , wmY be a vector in 
Qm, and suppose we are given a profile p g M1. We use the vector w, which is called 
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a weighting vector, to assign points to each candidate, and the candidate who receives 
the most points is declared to be the winner. We do this as follows. For each tabloid jc, 
if candidate c¡ is in row j of x, then she will be given Wjp(x) points. Summing over 
all tabloids x € Xk then determines the total number of points assigned to candidate 
Ci. We will refer to this as & positional voting procedure of type X based on w. 
For example, consider our "three-candidate and eleven- voter" example above. If we 
use a positional voting procedure with weighting vector w = [1,5, 0]', where 0 < s < 
1, then candidate c' will receive (5x 1) + (0x5) + (6x0) = 5 points, candidate 
c2 will receive (2 x 1) + (7 x s) + (2 x 0) = 2 + 75" points, and candidate c^ will 
receive (4 x 1) + (4 x s) + (3 x 0) = 4 + 45 points. We encode these points in the 
results vector r = [5, 2 + 75, 4 + 45]'. 
The point, of course, of using the parameter 5 in this example is that it highlights 
one of the things that makes voting theory so interesting: for a fixed profile p, the 
outcomes of an election can vary wildly with the choice of an election procedure. In 
fact, as Saari points out in [14], 
"... rather than reflecting the views of the voters, it is entirely possible for an 
election outcome to more accurately reflect he choice of an election procedure." 
To see this, note that in the above example, when 5 = 0, we have the well-known plu- 
rality voting procedure ("vote for your favorite"), in which case c' wins with a results 
vector of r = [5, 2, 4]'. When 5 = 1 ("vote for everyone but your least favorite"), c2 
wins with a results vector of r = [5, 9, 8]', and when 5 = 1/2, c3 wins with a results 
vector of r = [5, 5|, 6]'. (See Chapter 2 of [14] for this and other voting paradoxes.) 
One attractive feature of positional voting is that the results vectors they produce can 
be realized as the product of a matrix, which we will denote by Tw, and the profile in 
question. The row /, column j entry of Tw is the number of points awarded to candidate 
Ci based on her position in the yth tabloid. For example, if p and w = [1, 5, 0]' are as 
above, then 
"3" 
"i i 5 o 5 oi I r 5 
rw(p)= 501 105 ^ = 2 + 75 =r. 
[0 5 0 5 1 lj Q '_4 + 4s 
4_ 
In fact, and this is a simple but key insight, every positional voting method of type À 
based on a weighting vector w can be viewed as a linear transformation rw : Mx -> 
M(l'n~l) since we may use the tabloids in Xihn~l) to index the set of candidates. For 
example, we have T[ììSìOy : M(111) -> M(12) in the example above. 
Recognizing that rw : Mk -> M(Un~l) is a linear transformation is certainly use- 
ful, but there are other, hidden algebraic structures within the framework we have just 
constructed. To begin to see some of these structures, let X = (Xiy . . . , km) be a com- 
position of n. There are n' tableaux of shape À. In fact, we may think of a tableau as a 
full ranking of the candidates by reading, left to right, top to bottom, the entries of the 
tableau. For example, the tableau 
TTT" 
J 3_ 
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would correspond to the full ranking 
T 
_5_ 
J_ . 
3 
4 
This is useful, because we may then view a vote for the tabloid 
T~5~ 
1 3 
Ã1 
as coming from anyone whose full ranking of the candidates corresponds to one of the 
tableaux in the equivalence class of the tabloid. For example, the above tabloid could 
correspond to any of the following full rankings: 
Ti iti it] nr 
_5_ _5_ _2_ J_ 
_L ' J_ ' _L ' J_ • 
3 13 1 
4 4 4 4 
This simple insight allows us to view profiles p e Mk as elements of M(1 '1} in the 
following manner. Let / be the number of full rankings corresponding to a tabloid of 
shape X. Define i : Mk -> M(1  1} (think "inclusion") by mapping each tabloid (i.e., 
each indicator function) to the sum of its corresponding full rankings times 1//. For 
example, the tabloid of shape X = (2, 2, 1) above would be mapped to 
/it] it] pn p5~]> 
j 5 5 2 2 
3 13 1 
^ 4 _4_ _4_ 4 ; 
Let p € M' and define p = ¿(p). In other words, each profile p e Mk may be 
viewed as a profile p e M(1- 1} that is constant on the equivalence classes that form the 
tabloids of shape k. Moreover, if w = [w' , . . . , wmY is a weighting vector associated 
to X, and we define w to be the weighting vector in Qn whose first Ài entries are equal 
to tui, whose next A.2 entries are equal to W2, and so on, then 
rw(p) = 7V(p). 
For example, suppose X = (2, 1), w = [3, 0]', and 
"1 2~1 FI 3~l FI 3~ 
Then w = [3, 3,0]', 
P"f(ffl*ffl)+2(ffl*ffl) + i( *ffl)' 
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and 
1-5- 
2 
2 
"3 3 Ol |~5l [3 3 3 O 3 Ol 5 
rw(p)= 303 4 = 303303 ] = 7V(p). 
033 7 030333 ï 
2 
7 
-2- 
4. REPRESENTATION THEORY AND THE SYMMETRIC GROUP. We have 
just seen that profiles can be viewed as vectors, and that each positional voting pro- 
cedure can be viewed as a linear transformation. I  this section, we describe the role 
that the symmetric group plays in positional voting. In particular, as we illustrate be- 
low, each map Tw : Mx - ► M(l'n~l) is more than just a linear transformation - it is a 
QSn-module homomorphism. 
To explain, let À be a composition of n. The symmetric group Sn acts naturally on 
the set Xx of tabloids of shape k by permuting the entries of the tabloids. For example, 
if n = 5 and a = (1 3)(2 5 4), then 
I 2 3 5 1 = 1 q(2) a(3) a(5) | = I 5 14 
G' 1 4 | 1 ct(1) or (4)"] I 3 2 1 
We may extend the action of Sn on Xx to an action of Sn on the profile space Mx by 
defining (ap)(jc) = p(a~lx). Moreover, we may extend this action to an action of the 
group ring QSn on Mx where if a = ¿2*esn a°a> then (*P)(*) = Y,oesn aoV(o~lx). 
The action of QSn on Mx turns Mx into something called a QSn-module. We will 
not discuss modules in general in this paper (see, for example, [5] for a nice introduc- 
tion to modules). We will, however, describe some of the more useful implications of 
this realization as far as voting is concerned. 
To begin, note that, for each element a e Q5n, there is a linear transformation La : 
Mx -> Mx defined by setting La(p) = ap. If we let End(MÀ) denote the ring of linear 
transformations from Mx to itself (the ring of endomorphisms), then this defines a ring 
homomorphism p : QSn -> End(Mx). 
The homomorphism p is an example of a representation of QSn since each element 
a e QSn may be "represented" by a linear transformation p(a) = La e End(Mx). 
Furthermore, if we restrict p to the elements of 5n, then the images are all invertible 
linear transformations. In other words, we have a group homomorphism p lsn' Sn -> 
Aut(MA) = GL(Mk), which is a representation of Sn. This connection between mod- 
ules and representations, even though it will not explicitly occur again in our paper, is 
at the heart of the representation theoretic results we use. 
The fact that Mx is a QSn -module tells us that we can write Mx as a direct sum of 
QSn-submodules, which are subspaces that are invariant under the action of Q5n (and 
are therefore QSn -modules themselves). In other words, there are decompositions 
mx = mx e . • • e Mk 
such that, for all a e QSn and p¿ € M¡9 ap¿ e Mh 
A submodule U of a module M is said to be simple if U ^ {0}, and the only sub- 
modules of U are {0} and U itself. It turns out that, up to isomorphism, there are only 
a finite number of distinct simple QSn -modules. Furthermore, these simple modules 
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can be (and typically are) indexed by the partitions of n. In this paper, we use a well- 
known indexing scheme (see [19]), and we denote the simple QSn -module indexed by 
the partition /x of n by Sß. 
As an example, it turns out that M(12) = 5(3) 0 5(21) and M(111) ^  5(3) 0 5(21) 0 
5(21) © 5(111). To make these decompositions more concrete, consider the following 
decomposition of M(12): 
^■([ilMK'Hi])- 
Both of the subspaces on the right are invariant under the action of QS3. The first 
space, the span of the "all-ones" vector, is obviously invariant under the action of QS3. 
After all, the entries in these vectors are all equal, and permuting the entries of such 
vectors does not change this fact. 
The second subspace, which is the orthogonal complement (with respect to the usual 
dot product) of the first subspace, is the subspace of vectors whose entries um to zero. 
Since this property too is preserved under the action of QS3, it too is a submodule of 
M(l,2). 
Both of these subspaces are simple QS3-modules. The first space is isomorphic to 
5(3), and in general, we use S(n) to denote this "trivial", one-dimensional QSn -module 
that has the property that every element of Sn acts as the identity linear transforma- 
tion. The second space is isomorphic to S(21), and in general, 5(n-11) is the (n - 1)- 
dimensional simple module that is isomorphic to the orthogonal complement of the 
span of the all-ones vector in the ^-dimensional QSn -module M(1>/1~1) = M^"1^. 
To see how all of this is related to positional voting, let À = (Ài, . . . , km) be a 
composition of n, let w = [w' , . . . , wmY be a weighting vector, and consider the posi- 
tional voting procedure 7W : Mx - > M*1*"""1* of type X based on w. First, note that the 
linear transformation Tw is actually a QSn-module homomorphism. In other words, if 
a e QS„, then rw(ap) = aTw(p). After all, if a e Sn, then we are simply asking that 
rw(orp) = arw(p), which is the same as saying that, "if we permute the labels on the 
candidates, then we need only permute the original scores in the same way." We are 
just extending this notion, which is called neutrality (see, for example, [18]), to the 
action of the entire group ring. 
Viewing Ty, as a QSn -module homomorphism is helpful for a couple of reasons. 
First, if T : M - ► iV is a module homomorphism, then the kernel of T is a submodule 
of M, and the image of T is a submodule of N. In fact, if we define the effective space 
E(T) of T to be the orthogonal complement (with respect to the usual dot product) of 
the kernel of 7' then E(T) = T(M) as modules. Therefore, knowing something about 
£(7W) might help us say something about 7W. 
Second, once we know we are dealing with module homomorphisms, we can look 
to an elementary but immensely useful theorem for insight: 
Schur's Lemma. Every nonzero module homomorphism between simple modules is 
an isomorphism. 
How can we make use of Schur's Lemma in our study of voting? Consider our posi- 
tional voting procedure rw : Mk -> Af (lt/l~1). As we noted above, the module M(hn~l) 
is isomorphic to a direct sum of the simple modules S(n) and S(n~lA). This means that 
any simple submodule U of Mk that is not isomorphic to S(n) or S{n~ììl) must be in the 
kernel of Tw, i.e., such a submodule only contains information that will have absolutely 
no effect on the results of the election. 
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For example, if n = 3 and we have Tw : M(111) -+ M(12), then since M(12) = 
S(3) e 5(2,u and M(i,i,i) ^ 50) e 5(2.D e 5(2,1) e 5(i,i,i)? we ^^ that the kemd of 
Ty, must contain exactly one copy of 5(111). We also know that the kernel of Tw must 
contain at least one copy of 5(21) since M (111) contains two copies of 5(21) and M (1'2) 
contains only one copy. We will say more about this below. Before we do, however, 
we need one more idea. Although it may appear simple on the surface, it will play a 
major role in what follows. 
First, note that there is a bijection between the full rankings in X(h "J) and the 
permutations in 5„, where the tabloid 
¿i 
¿2 
in-' 
in 
is mapped to the permutation a with the property that a{j) = ij. It follows that we 
may view each profile p e M(1< m1) as an element of QSn, where we simply replace 
each full ranking with its associated permutation. This means that if p e Mx, then 
we may view p e M(1  l) as an element of QSn that is constant on the left cosets of 
the subgroup of Sn that fixes the tabloid containing the tableau corresponding to the 
identity of Sn. (We will use this fact in the proof of Theorem 1.) 
How is viewing a profile as an element of QSn helpful? It means that our positional 
voting procedures are more than just linear transformations, and more than just Q5„- 
module homomorphisms - they are the results of profiles acting on weighting vectorsl 
More specifically, if p € QSn is a profile, and w eQn = M(l'n~l) is a weighting vector, 
then 
rw(p) = pw. 
For example, in the "three-candidate and eleven-voter" example introduced above, 
note that if e € 53 is the identity and we use the usual cycle notation for the other 
elements in 53, then 
"3" 
"l 1 s 0 s Ol 2 
rw(p)= s o i i o * ; 0 s 0 s 1 lj jj 
"il [il fol |~o" = 3^+20+21+45 
oj 'j' 'j' |_i 
"l" 
= (3e + 2(23) + 2(123) +4(13)) s 
0 
= pw. 
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This realization - that if p € Af (lf-fl), then Tw(p) = pw, i.e., "the acted upon has 
become the actor" - leads us to our first heorem. Before we state the theorem, though, 
we need a few observations about weighting vectors whose entries um to zero. 
It is important to keep in mind the relatively simple structure of the space M(ln~1} in 
which our weighting vector w resides (together, of course, with all of our results vec- 
tors). In particular, since M (1/l~1) = S(n) © S(n~U), we may write w = lw + w, where 
lw e 5(w) is the projection of w onto the all-ones vector 1, and w e S^n~lìì) is the pro- 
jection of w into the orthogonal (n - 1) -dimensional subspace of vectors whose entries 
sum to zero. For example, if n = 3 and w = [1, s, 0]', then lw = f1^, ^, ±±*]' and 
W - ih^. 25-1 -1-5-lf - *■ 3 ' 3 ' 3 -" * 
Since 
7V(P) = pw = p(lw + w) = plw + pw 
and plw e S(n' all of the information that will determine the outcome of the election 
is contained in the summand pw. After all, plw is simply some multiple of the all-ones 
vector and will therefore not differentiate b tween any of the candidates. Because of 
this, we will focus most of our attention on weighting vectors w e M(Un~l) = Qn such 
that w = w, i.e., weighting vectors whose entries um to zero. 
For convenience, we say that a vector in Q" whose entries sum to zero is a sum- 
zero vector. We also say that such a vector is nontrivial if it does not equal the zero 
vector (since the weighting vector w = 0 would obviously lead to the trivial result that 
the candidates all tie with zero points). A consequence of using a sum-zero weighting 
vector w is that the results vector r = Tw(p) will also be a sum-zero vector. Keep in 
mind, however, that the winner is still the candidate that receives the most points. 
Theorem 1. Let n > 2, and let k = (Ài, . . . , km) be a partition of n. Suppose that 
Wi, . . . , iff* form a linearly independent set of weighting vectors in Qm such that 
wT, . . . , w^ are sum-zero vectors. lfx',...,rkare any sum-zero results vectors in Qn, 
then there exist infinitely many profiles p € Mk such that TW/ (p) = r¿ for all i such 
that 1 < i < k. 
Proof. We first consider the full ranking case where À = (1, . . . , 1). In this case, 
wf = w¡. The sum-zero vectors in Qn = M(hn~l) form a simple QS„ -submodule (that 
is isomorphic to S(n~U)), which we will denote by U. Since the weighting vectors 
are linearly independent, there exists a linear transformation T : U -> U such that 
r(Wf) = r, for all i such that 1 < / < k. 
By a theorem of Burnside (see, for example, [3]), every linear transformation from 
a simple QSn -module to itself can be realized as the action of some element in QSn. 
In other words, there is some a e QSn such that T(n) = au for all u e U. 
Moreover, there exists a nontrivial Q-subspace of elements b € QSn such that 
bn = 0 for all u e U. For example, the elements in QSn with constant coeffi- 
cients have this property. If we set p = a + b, then the theorem follows since 
rw/ (p) = pw/ = awi + bvfi = r, + 0 = rf. 
For a general A., note that if {wi, . . . , w*} c Qm is linearly independent, then so 
is {wT, . . . , yfk' C Qn. As we saw above, there exists an element a e QSn such that 
aWi = rf for all i such that 1 < i < k. Let H be the subgroup of Sn that fixes the 
tabloid of shape X that contains the tableau corresponding to the identity of Sn. Let 
R ç Sn be a set of coset representatives for the left cosets of H in Sn. 
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Since a e QSn, we know that a is a formal inear combination of elements of Sn: 
a= J2a°G = J2r'12arhh)' 
aeSn reR 'heH / 
For each reR, let a!r = (l/|tf|) E^// arh e Q, and let 
a' = 52a'rr(j2h)e®Sn. reR 'heH ) 
Since hWi = wj for all h e H, it follows that aw¡ = af'v¡. As was noted above, there 
exists a nontrivial Q-subspace of elements b e QSn such that byv¡ = 0. If we set p' = 
a! + è', then p' may be viewed as an element of Mx, and the theorem follows since 
Twt (p') = p'w7 = a''v¡ + b'Wi = r, + 0 = r*. ■ 
Theorem 1 is an extension of Saari's Theorem 1 in [8] in two ways. First, Saari's 
theorem is a statement about ordinal rankings, i.e., the order in which the candidates 
finish in the election. Our theorem says something about cardinal rankings, i.e., the 
actual number of points that each candidate receives. Second, whereas Saari's theorem 
focuses on the fully ranked situation, we address both the fully and partially ranked 
situations simultaneously. 
Both theorems essentially imply that as long as the weighting vectors Wi , . . . , w* 
are different enough, it could very well be the case that there is no relationship what- 
soever among 7Wl (p), . . . , TWit(p). Moreover, as Saari describes in [14] and [15], this 
is just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to answering the question, "How bad can it 
get?" Note, however, that our proof is decidedly algebraic in nature. Whereas Saari's 
proof of Theorem 1 in [8] uses facts about open mappings, our proof of Theorem 1 
uses an important result by Burnside concerning the endomorphism ring of simple 
modules. 
5. APPROVAL VOTING. Theorem 1 may be used to address paradoxical situations 
that arise in voting procedures related to positional voting. For example, the approval 
voting procedure asks a voter to return an (unordered) list of the candidates of whom 
she approves. A candidate receives a point for each time she appears on such a list, and 
the candidate receiving the most points is declared the winner. (For more on approval 
voting, see [2].) 
We naturally assume that if a voter were to return a fully ranked list of the candi- 
dates, then the candidates she would approve of would make up the top portion of her 
list. We may therefore imagine a situation in which each voter is asked to return a fully 
ranked list of the candidates together with a cutoff point. Candidates above the cutoff 
are those whom our voter approves of, and those below the cutoff are not. 
We will denote the cutoff point in a tableau with a blank space separating the "ap- 
proved" candidates from the other candidates. For example, if n = 3, then the top row 
of Figure 3 contains those tableaux with cutoffs that would be used by voters who only 
approve of their top candidate, whereas the second row contains those tableaux with 
cutoffs that would be used by those voters who approve of their top two candidates. 
Although it is perfectly fine for a voter to approve of all or none of the candidates 
in approval voting, such a preference will have absolutely no impact on the outcome 
of the election. For convenience, we will therefore assume that our voters approve of 
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Figure 3. Tableaux with cutoffs for approval voting. 
at least one, but not all, of the candidates. In this setting, our ranked approval profile 
looks like 
" 
Pi 
" 
P2 
P= ; 
-Pn-1- 
where p¿ corresponds to those voters who have approved of exactly / candidates. 
Approval voting is related to positional voting in that we may view it as being made 
up of several positional voting systems occurring simultaneously. To explain, consider 
the weighting vector 
i n-i 
and note that the sum-zero portion of the results of the election using approval voting 
is given by 
PA + P2Î2 H  '- Pn-lîn-l = rapp- 
On the other hand, for a positional vote with respect to the weighting vector w, the 
sum-zero portion of the result is given by 
(Pi+P2 + "- + P«-i)w = rpos. 
In the spirit of extending the ideas found in Theorem 1 to other settings such as 
approval voting, the following theorem shows that rapp and rpos need not have anything 
in common. 
Theorem 2. Let n > 3, let rapp and rpos be any two sum-zero results vectors in Q", 
and let w be any nontrivial sum-zero weighting vector in Qn. Then there exist infinitely 
many ranked approval profiles 
' 
Pi 
" 
P2 
P= ; 
-Pn-1- 
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such that the approval voting outcome ofp is rapp, and the positional voting outcome 
with respect to w is rpos. 
Proof. It must be the case that either w and if i are linearly independent or w and 02 are 
linearly independent. Suppose, without loss of generality, that w and 02 are linearly 
independent. Set pi and p2 such that piili = rapp, p2a2 = 0, and p2w = rpos - PiW, 
which we know can be done by Theorem 1. Then set p3 = • • • = pw_i = 0. The re- 
sulting ranked approval profile phas the desired property. Furthermore, by Theorem 1, 
there are an infinite number of such ranked approval profiles. ■ 
6. EQUIVALENT WEIGHTING VECTORS AND EFFECTIVE SPACES. At 
this point, it is helpful to put an equivalence relation on weighting vectors. The idea 
is that wo weighting vectors hould be equivalent if and only if they yield the same 
ordinal rankings for all profiles. For convenience, we focus our attention on the fully 
ranked situation throughout this section. 
Let the all-ones vector in Qn be denoted by 1. We say that wo weighting vectors w 
and x in Qn are equivalent, and write w ~ x, if and only if there xist a, ß e Q such 
that a > 0 and x = aw + ßl. This equivalence relation is often used in the literature 
to simplify calculations and to pinpoint non-cosmetic differences between different 
positional voting procedures. 
To motivate this equivalence relation, note that, for any positive rational number 
a e Q, it makes sense to say that w is equivalent to aw since, for every p e M(lî -tl), 
the ordinal ranking iven by Tw(p) is exactly the same as that of Tayv(p). After all, the 
entries in Tayf(p) are simply the entries of Tw(p) multiplied by a > 0. 
Furthermore, suppose a, ß e Q where a > 0. If x = aw + ßl, then the ordinal 
ranking iven by Tx(p) is exactly the same as that given by Tw(p). This is because the 
addition of ßl to aw changes each candidate's score by exactly the same amount. 
Note that w ~ x if and only if there is a positive rational number y e Q such that 
w = y% i.e., the sum-zero component of w is a positive multiple of the sum-zero com- 
ponent of x. This is helpful to see because, by Theorem 1, it means that wo weighting 
vectors w and x will always yield the same outcome if and only if w ~ x. We therefore 
have the following theorem: 
Theorem 3. (Theorem 2.3.1 in [10]) Let n>2, and let w and x be weighting vectors 
in Qn. The ordinal rankings ö/7w(p) and Tx(p) will be the same for all p e M(l'~A) if 
and only ifvt ~ x. 
It is helpful to view Theorem 3 in terms of effective spaces, which is an approach 
used extensively and with great success by Saari (see, for example, [12], [13], [14], 
and [16]). Recall that he effective space E(T) of a linear transformation T isthe or- 
thogonal complement keriT)1 of the kernel of T. For convenience, ifw is a weighting 
vector, then we will denote the effective space of Tw by £(w) (rather than EiT^)). 
As a QSn -submodule of the profile space QSn, the effective space £(w) of any 
nontrivial sum-zero weighting vector w is isomorphic to S(n~hl). If w e Qn has a 
nontrivial projection onto the all-ones vector and w ^  0, then £(w) = 5(w) © S(n~M). 
On the other hand, if w is simply a nonzero multiple of the all-ones vector (so w = 0), 
then £(w) = S(n) (and we only get ties). 
Theorem 4. Let w and x be nontrivial sum-zero weighting vectors in Qn. Then 
£(w) = E(x) if and only ifw^xorw  x. Furthermore, if £(w) ^  £(x), then 
£(w) H £(x) = {0}. 
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Proof. Suppose £(w) = £(x). This implies that ker(Tw) = ker(rx) = ker(7Lx). By 
Theorem 1, if w no x and w oo - x, then there xists a profile p such that pw ^  0 and 
px = p(-x) = 0. Thus, if £(w) = £(x), then w~xorw~ -x. 
On the other hand, if w ~ x or w ~ -x, then w and x are linearly dependent 
(since we are assuming that w = w and x = x). Thus, ker(rw) = ker(rx), implying 
that £(w) = £(x). 
Finally, £(w) n E(x) is a submodule of both £(w) and £(x), and £(w) and E(x) 
are simple submodules (that are isomorphic to S{n~Xìì)). Thus, if E(w) ^ £(x), then it 
follows that £(w) n E(x) = {0}. ■ 
By Theorem 4, distinct effective spaces for sum-zero weighting vectors intersect 
only at 0. We can, however, say more. To explain, we write w J_ x if the dot product 
of w and x is zero, i.e., if they are orthogonal. Furthermore, if U and W are subspaces 
of a vector space such that every vector in U is orthogonal to every vector in W, then 
we write U J_ W. 
Recall that we may view permutations a € Sn as tableaux in M(1  1}. For example, 
the permutation a = (124) (35) corresponds to the tableau 
~2~ 
4 
5 
1 
"T 
in M01110. In particular, note that he position that candidate j occupies with respect 
to the permutation a is given by or"1 (y), in which case, for a weighting vector w = 
[tüi, . . . , w„]', candidate y would receive uv-i^) points. 
Theorem 5. Ifxv and x are nontrivial sum-zero weighting vectors in Qn, then E(v?) _L 
E(x) if and only ifw _L x. 
Proof First, note that £(w) is simply the row space of Tw when we view Tw as a matrix 
with respect to the indicator functions of Af (1--1). It follows that if £(w) J_ £(x), then 
each row of Tw is orthogonal to each row of Tx. The dot product of the first row of 7W 
and the first row of Tx, however, isa non-zero multiple of the dot product of w and x, 
as we show below in (1). It follows that if £(w) _L £(x), then wlx. 
On the other hand, suppose w _L x. Partition the permutations of the candidates into 
n sets X', . . . , Xn where X¿ contains the permutations that have the first candidate, 
d, in the ith position. Within each X,-, every candidate other than c' occupies every 
position other than the fth position the same number of times, namely (n - 2)! times. 
This is because the ith position is taken by c' , and by fixing Cj,j ^ 1, in some position, 
we are free to place the other candidates in (n - 2)! ways. 
The columns of Tw are indexed by the permutations of the n candidates. The entry 
in row j and column o is wa-'U), which is, of course, the weight given to candidate j 
based on the permutation a. 
Let r' (w) be the first row of Tw, and let r, (x) be the j th row of Tx. These rows may 
be viewed as elements of QSn, where (n(w))(or) = wo-'{X) and (rj(x))(a) = xa-'{j). 
Taking dot products yields 
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n(w) • r;(x) = J2w"-Hnx<T-Hj) 
o 
n 
= X X W°-H')xo-Hj) 
i=l aeXi 
n 
1=1 0<€X; 
If; = l.then 
J2 x°-lU) = ^ 2 x"-xw = (n - 1)bCi- 
creX/ aeX,- 
It follows that 
n 
r,(w)T1(x) = ^«;i((n-l)!jc/) 1 = 1 
= (n-l)!^u;/x/ 
i=i 
= (n-l)!(w-x) (1) 
= 0 
since w ± x. 
On the other hand, if j ^ 1, then 
J2 xo-Hj) = (n - 2)'J2*k = (" - 2)! (-*.•). 
which implies that 
n 
n(w) - r;(x) = £ u;,.«* - 2)!(- je,-)) 
i=i 
n 
= -(n-2)'J2wixi 
i=i 
= -(n-2)!(w.x) 
= 0. 
Thus, if w ± x, then we have that ri(w) J_ ry(x) for all 1 < j < n. To complete the 
proof, note that he ith row of Tw is the result of acting on rx (w) with the transposition 
I = (1 î) that swaps 1 and /. It follows that 
rf(w) • o(x) = gr^w)) • (Çr/x)) = n(w) • rHj)(x) = 0. 
Thus, the row space of Tw is orthogonal to the row space of Tx. In other words, £(w) J_ 
£(x). ■ 
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7. THE BORDA COUNT. If you are familiar at all with Saari's work, then you know 
that the Borda count, i.e., the positional voting procedure for n candidates that uses the 
weighting vector w = [n - 1, n - 2, . . . , 2, 1, 0]', plays a special role when it comes 
to positional voting. In this section, we use the algebraic framework we have thus far 
created to show why this is the case. In doing so, we also begin to pave the way toward 
an analogue to the Borda count for partially ranked voting data. 
To motivate our discussion, consider the so-called Copeland method for running 
an election. This procedure is based on information concerning head-to-head contests 
between the candidates. For each candidate c¡, let w(i) and Z(i') be the number of 
head-to-head contests won and lost, respectively, by c,-. The winner under Copeland's 
method is the candidate whose difference w(i) - /(/) is largest. 
In our "three-candidate and eleven-voter" example, candidate c3 defeats both c' 
and C2 in head to head contests, and C2 defeats c'. The scores for candidates c', ci, 
and c3 are therefore 0 - 2 = -2, 1-1=0, and 2-0 = 2, respectively. Thus, c3 is 
the winner using the Copeland method. Note, by the way, that c3 beat all of the other 
candidates in head-to-head contests. When such a candidate exists, she is said to be a 
Condorcet winner. 
What makes the Copeland method interesting for us is that all of the results can be 
derived from the image of a map P : M(1' 1} ->► m(11/i"2) which we call the pairs 
map. The idea behind the pairs map is that it extracts all of the necessary information 
concerning pairs of candidates (think head-to-head contests). The defining character- 
istic of P is that it maps a tabloid u in Xa 1} to the sum of all tabloids in x(llw~2) in 
which the candidates who are ranked first and second are ranked in the same order as 
they are ranked in u. 
For example, suppose n = 4. Then the image of the tabloid 
T~ 
1 
4 
2 
is 
ti iti iti rn nn nr 
2 4 | 1 1 2 | 1 1 4 | I 2 3 | 1 3 4 | | 1 3 
Given the profile p e M (1 "•'1), the scores for Copeland's method can all be deter- 
mined from the image of p under the pairs map. You need only consult the coefficients 
of P(p) to determine the winner of each head-to-head contest. Moreover, there are 
several examples of voting procedures that essentially rely solely on pairs data (see, 
for example, a list of such procedures in Chapter 4 of [1]). 
An interesting question now arises. What relationship, if any, is there between a map 
Ty, and the pairs map P? To make this question more concrete, let T : V -> W and 
V : V -► U be two linear transformations defined on the same vector space V. We 
say that T is recoverable from T if there exists a linear transformation R : W -► U 
such that T = R o T. It is easy to show that T is recoverable from T if and only if 
ker(r) ç ker(r) which, in turn, occurs if and only if E(T') ç E(T). 
This leads us to a much more specific form of the question above. For what weight- 
ing vectors w e Qn is Tw recoverable from P? To answer this question, we will focus 
on the effective spaces of our positional voting procedures and pairs map. Once again, 
the representation theory of the symmetric group will play an important role. 
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The first thing we want to do is to note that the pairs map P : M(1' ° -> M(lln"2) 
is a QSn -module homomorphism. Thus, we may make use of Schur 's Lemma. Next, 
we turn our attention to the effective space of P. The codomain M(lln~2) of the pairs 
map P has the following decomposition into simple submodules: 
^(l.l.n-2) ~ £(«) 0 ^(n-1,1) 0 £(/i-U) 0 ^(n-2,2) 0 ^(n-2,1,1) 
Furthermore, it can be shown (using, for example, a dimension argument) that the im- 
age, and therefore the effective space, of P is isomorphic to S(n) 0 S(n~hi) 0 5(n"211). 
Since there is only one copy of S*"-1«1) in this decomposition, it follows by Theorem 4 
that there are at most two nontrivial equivalence classes of weighting vectors whose 
effective spaces are contained in the effective space of P. As the following theorem 
(which is essentially implied by Theorem 3.2.1 in [10]) shows, there are such equiv- 
alence classes. They are the equivalence classes that contain the Borda count and its 
negative. 
Theorem 6. Let n > 2, and let w e Qn be a nontrivial weighting vector (i.e., w <* 1). 
The map Tw is recoverable from the pairs map P if and only ifyv or - w is equivalent 
to the Borda count. 
Proof By the above discussion, it is enough to show that if w is the Borda count 
weighting vector, i.e., w = [n - 1, n - 2, . . . , 2, 1, 0]' € Qn, then Tw is recoverable 
from P. This, however, is trivial. In fact, the results vector one obtains by using the 
Borda count can be (and often is) viewed as the sum of the points awarded to a candi- 
date from all of her head-to-head victories, and these points are encoded (blatantly) in 
the image of the pairs map P. ■ 
One of the nice properties that the Borda count enjoys is that if there is a Condorcet 
winner, she is never ranked last by the Borda count (see, for example, Corollary 5 
in [12]). By Theorem 1, any weighting vector that is not equivalent to w = [n - 1, 
n - 2, . . . , 2, 1, 0]' does not enjoy this property. In fact, in the class of positional vot- 
ing procedures for fully ranked profiles, the Borda count maximizes the probability 
that a Condorcet winner is actually ranked first [20]. For more on the relationship 
between the Borda count and Copeland's method, see [7] and [17]. 
The Borda count also has what is called reversal symmetry. In other words, under 
the Borda count, if all of the voters were to completely reverse their ballots so that 
their first choice is now their last, their second choice is now second to last, and so 
on, then the resulting ordinal ranking would be the complete reversal of the original 
result. When n = 3, the Borda count is the unique weighting vector (up to equivalence) 
with this property, but when n > 4, there are others. For example, w = [6, 5, 1, 0]' 
has this property. This is easy to see, however, once you recognize that [6, 5, 1, 0]' ~ 
[3,2,-2,-3]'. 
8. ANALOGUES TO THE BORDA COUNT. Recall that if voters are returning 
fully ranked ballots, then the Borda count and its negative are the unique (up to equiv- 
alence) nontrivial positional voting procedures that are recoverable from the pairs map. 
What if, however, the voters do not return fully ranked ballots? What if it has been de- 
cided that it is infeasible to ask voters to rank all of the candidates? 
In this section, we turn our attention to the "rank-only-your-top-£" situation in 
which À = (l,...,l,/i-fc) = (1*, n - k). By generalizing only slightly the pairs 
map P : M(1  1} -> MilXn'2' we are able to generalize Theorem 6 to the "rank- 
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only-your-top-&" situation. Interestingly, and in contrast o the fully ranked case, we 
show that there is more than one "Borda-like" equivalence class of weighting vectors. 
We generalize the pairs map as follows. Let 0 < r < 1, and define P* : M(1 >n~k) -► 
M(llw~2) as we did for the pairs map P in the full ranking case, except now, if two 
candidates c, and c, are tied for last place, then we assign both of the ordered pairs 
(cf , Cj) and (c,, c,-) the value r (think "points for tying"). By letting r be a parameter, 
we are able to consider simultaneously an infinite number of analogues of the pairs 
map P. 
For example, suppose n = 4 and k = (1, 1, 2). Then the image of the tabloid 
~2~ 
J 3_ 
is 
jü PE] p[] pD H E] CE 
T] + T~| + ~3~| +T~1 +T] +r T] +r T] . 
1 3 | 3 4 I 1 4 | 2 3 1 1 2 | 2 4 | _2  4_ 
We now have the following question. For which partial weighting vectors w = 
[w', . . . , Wk+iY is Ty, recoverable from P*? To answer this question, define b = 
[b', . . . , bk+iY to be the partial weighting vector corresponding to k = (1*, n - k) 
where b¡ = n - i for 1 < i < k and 
bk+l = ^(n-k-l). 
This is the partial weighting vector one would get by "averaging the Borda count 
with respect to À." In other words, we essentially use the Borda count for the top k 
candidates, but we assign the average of the last n - k Borda count points to each of 
the last n - k candidates. This average is 
n-k 
' 
(O+i+2+...+(„-*-,>)=<"-^'*;-*> 2(n-k) 
= l(n-k-l)=bk+l. 
Similarly, we define bT = [b', . . . , è£+1]' in exactly the same way, except that we 
set 
bl+i=T(n-k-l). 
In other words, b] = bt for 1 < / < Jfc, but b'+x = 2rbk+'. Thus, if r = 1/2, then 
b = bT. 
Our first goal is to show that both Tb and Thr are recoverable from P*. That is, we 
want to show that there exist linear transformations cph and Vv such that Tb = (f^o P* 
and rbr = for o P*. With that in mind, note that if v e M(llw"2), then we can express 
v as a linear combination of tabloids in x(lln~2). Let vij be the coefficient in this linear 
combination of the tabloid in which c¡ and Cj are ranked first and second, respectively. 
Then define 
far : M(M'w-2) -► M(1'w-1} 
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by setting 
In other words, the result corresponding to the ith candidate isdetermined by summing 
all of the entries corresponding to the ordered pairs (i, j) where j 5¿ i , i.e., all of the 
pairs in which candidate c¡ is beating some other candidate. 
The map Vv is easily seen to be a QSn -module homomorphism. If we let ue be the 
indicator function corresponding to the tabloid that contains the identity permutation 
e e Sn, then we may easily check that 
[(irhroPTk)(ue)]i=bJ. 
Together with the fact hat Vv and P* are QSn -module homomorphisms, this implies 
that Thr = i/v o P*. Thus, Tbr is recoverable from P*. 
Similarly, we may construct a linear transformation ^ such that Th = ^ o P*. 
First, note that for any indicator function m, if we sum the entries of P*(k), we always 
get the same value E where 
E = (n-l) + (n-2) + .>- + (n-k) + 2r(n~ Y 
With that in mind, we define the QSn -module homomorphism 
by setting 
z '^ * k,l J 
Again, we may check (perhaps with a bit more work this time) that 
[(<phoPzk)(ue)]i=bi. 
Thus, Tb = cpbo P*, implying that Th is also recoverable from P*. 
Our next goal is to show that b and bT are equivalent if and only if r = 1/2. This 
is straightforward. If they were equivalent, then the ratios of the differences between 
successive ntries would have to be the same. In particular, it would be the case that 
bk - bk+i b' - bTk+l 
This, however, istrue if and only if r = 1/2, since the above equation reduces to 
 1  1 
(n-k)-'{n-k- 1) 
~ 
(n-k)-r(n-k- 1) 
and solving for r shows that r = 1/2. We therefore have the following proposition: 
Proposition 1 . J^he weighting vectors b and br are equivalent if and only ifx = 1/2 
(in which case b = bT). 
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Finally, we turn our attention to characterizing those weighting vectors that are 
recoverable from P*. We begin with a proposition. 
Propositions. If x = 1/2, then the image of P* : M^'""^ -> M^Xn~2) contains 
exactly one copy of the simple module S(n~l'lK 
Proof Let / be the image of P*. Since / is a submodule of m(11w~2), and the simple 
module 5(w"11} appears exactly twice in any decomposition of M(hhn~2) into simple 
modules, we know that any decomposition of / into simple modules can contain at 
most two copies of S^n~ltl' Furthermore, since b is a nontrivial weighting vector and 
Th = (fa o P*, we know that / must contain at least one copy of s(n~lilK 
Let J be the direct sum of the two simple modules that are isomorphic to 5(n"11} in 
a decomposition of Af (lflfB"2) into simple modules. In other words, J is the so-called 
isotypic subspace of M(lln~2) corresponding to S^n~]jl' It turns out that any simple 
submodule of M(lln"2) that is isomorphic to 5(w~11} is necessarily a submodule of /. 
We will make use of this fact shortly. 
Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that / contains two copies of S(n~h 1} when we 
decompose it into simple modules. In other words, assume that J ç /. Since r = 1/2, 
we have that Th = Thx . This implies that ^b ° P£ = Vv ° P£, and therefore that 
is the zero linear transformation. It follows that any vector in / must be in 
ker(<pb - Vv)- In other words, / ç ker((pb - Vv). 
Our assumption is that J ç. I. Given the above, we may contradict his assumption 
by finding a vector in J that is not in ker(<pb - t/v)- With this in mind, for each 
1 < i < n, let V/ € M(lln~2) be such that the coefficient corresponding to an ordered 
pair that contains i is (n - 2)/2, and is -1 otherwise. 
The sum of the entries of v,- is zero. Furthermore, these vectors generate a sub- 
module that is isomorphic to 5(n~11}. Thus each vf is in the 5(n"11} isotypic space 
/ of M(11/I"2), implying that each v,- is in /. One may easily verify, however, that 
V/ € ker <pb, but that v, £ ker i/v . Since this is a contradiction, it must be the case that 
/ contains exactly one copy of 5(n"lf 1). ■ 
The following theorem characterizes those weighting vectors that are recoverable 
from the map P*. More specifically, it says that, with respect to PT*, weighting vectors 
related to b and br form the analogues of the Borda count weighting vector [n - 1 , 
n - 2, . . . , 1, 0]' when it comes to the "rank-only-your-top-£" situation. 
Theorem*). Let w be a partial weighting vector with respect to X = (lk,n -k)where 
1 < k < n - 2. The positional map Tw is recoverable from the map Pk if and only if 
w is a linear combination of h and br. 
Proof If w is a linear combination of b and bT, then Tw is clearly recoverable from 
P*. On the other hand, suppose that Tw is recoverable from the pairwise map P*. If 
b^bT, then {b, bT} is a basis for the recoverable sum-zero weighting vectors since 
the image of P* contains at most two copies of the simple module S(rt~U). Thus w 
is a linear combination of b and bT. If b = br, however, then by Proposition 8, {b} 
is a basis for the recoverable sum-zero weighting vectors. In either case, the theorem 
follows. ■ 
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Recall that one of the nice properties of the Borda count is that if there is a Con- 
dorcet winner, then she is never ranked last by the Borda count. Condorcet win- 
ners make sense in the "rank-only-your-top-fc" situation as well since the pairs map 
p - M(1,...,D _» MdXn-2) and pk . M(lk,n-k) _+ M(hhn-2) haye the same codomain. 
It turns out that if a profile p e M(lk'n~k) has a Condorcet winner with respect to P*, 
then it has the same Condorcet winner with respect to all maps P*, where 0 < x' < 1. 
In other words, the existence of a Condorcet winner does not depend on r . 
As in the fully ranked case, it also turns out that if a Condorcet winner exists in 
the "rank-only-your-top-fc" situation, then she will never be ranked last under the po- 
sitional map 7b. More importantly, given what we have seen so far, it should hardly 
come as a surprise that this statement isnot true for any other weighting vector w such 
that b is not equivalent to w. Therefore, if the notion of a Condorcet winner is impor- 
tant to you, then it would certainly be reasonable to say that b is the unique (up to 
equivalence) analogue of the usual Borda count. 
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A Proof of the Pythagorean Theorem 
A,. 
-i x '/D a - x ^v. cu  *-s  ^z? 
Let the lengths of the sides of the right riangle A ABC be a, b, and c' as usual. 
Construct AD bisecting ZCAB, and DE perpendicular to AB. Then AADC = 
AADE. Let x = CD = DE. Then since ADBE is similar to AABC, we have 
x/{a - x) - b/c, and therefore x = ab/(b + c). But we also have (c - b)/x - 
a/b, so c - b = xa/b = a2 /(b + c), and therefore a2 + b2 = c2. 
- Submitted by Sang Woo Ryoo, student, Carlisle High School Carlisle, PA 
Editor's Note: Although this proof does not appear to be widely known, it is 
a rediscovery of a proof that has appeared in print before (E. S. Loomis, The 
Pythagorean Proposition, 2nd ed., National Council of Teachers of Mathemat- 
ics, Washington, DC, 1968, pp. 26-27). Loomis's proof can itself be seen as a 
refinement of an earlier proof (B. F. Yanney and J. A. Calderhead, New and old 
proofs of the Pythagorean theorem, this Monthly 3 (1896) 65-67). 
